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INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMENTARY
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE UNITED NATIONS COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF COEXISTENCE*
MARC-ANDRE EISSENt

T wo

of the main characteristics of the Council of Europe' are

stressed in paragraphs (a) and (b) of article 1 of its Statute. First,
the Council is a regional organization which seeks to achieve "greater
unity between its Members." Second, the political philosophy upon
which the Council is founded emphasizes "the maintenance and further
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms." The regional
nature of the organization and the goal of protecting basic rights
and freedoms within the Member States go hand in hand and cannot
be dissociated; the Preamble to the Statute and articles 3, 4, 5, and 82
confirm this very clearly.
However, paragraph (c) of article 1 stipulates that "participation
in the Council of Europe shall not affect the collaboration of its Members in the work of the United Nations," one of whose purposes also
consists of "promoting and3 encouraging respect for human rights and
for fundamental freedoms."
With both the Council of Europe and the United Nations purporting to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, how is
it possible for States to take part at one and the same time in activi* This article is a revised and expanded version of a work entitled Convention
europienne des Droits de l'Homme et Pacte des Nations Unies relatif aux droits civils
et politiques: problgmes de "coexistence," which was published by Mr. Eissen in
30 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES

OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND V6LKERRECHT 237

and 646 (1970).
t Registrar, European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe. Bachelor of
Laws, Strasbourg University, 1950; Higher Diplomas in Public and Private Law, 1951.
1.
MANUAL

For a general discussion of the Council of Europe see COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

(1970); A. H.

ROBERTSON, THE COUNCIL OF

EUROPE (1961).
2. The Statute of the Council of Europe is detailed and discussed in the sources

cited supra note 1. Articles 3, 4, 5, and 8 of the Statute require that Member States
accept the aims of the organization and particularly the objective of protecting human
rights and basic freedoms. Membership is contingent upon this; and States which
seriously violate this requirement may be suspended from representation on the Council
and asked (or forced) to withdraw.
3. U.N. CHARTER, Preamble, arts. 55, 56, 68, 1, para. 3 & 62, para. 2.
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ties proper to both the Council and the United Nations? How can
European regionalism be reconciled with universalism in these matters?
At first the question presented very little difficulty. The Charter
of the United Nations, adopted June 26, 1945, was fairly vague on the
subject of human rights and so was the Statute of the Council of
Europe, adopted May 5, 1949. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of December 10, 1948, 4 was much more specific and its moral
value and influence are not to be underestimated. Nevertheless, it had
no binding force, at least according to prevailing opinion. Moreover,
in order to secure the "universal and effective recognition and observance" of human rights, the Declaration itself envisaged "progressive measures, national and international," without excluding measures
of a regional kind. Lastly, the preparation of the International Covenants on Human Rights 5 met with many obstacles; progress was so
slow that one wondered whether the goal would ever be attained. Under these circumstances, there was nothing to restrain the Strasbourg
organization from taking advantage of its greater cohesion by moving
forward toward the realization of the protection of basic rights within
Member States.
Despite some reluctance, the Member States of the Council of
Europe resolved to set up a regional protection of human rights. But
in so doing they did not overlook article 1, paragraph (c), of the
Statute. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms 7 (hereinafter the Convention), which opened
for their signature on November 4, 1950, was-as stated in the Preamble
-a series of "first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the
Rights stated in the Universal Declaration." In sum, far from denying
its origins, the Convention presented itself as the "eldest daughter" of
the Universal Declaration. 8
4. G. A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/311 (1948).
5. See note 9 infra.
6. Modinos, The Coexistence of the European Convention on Human Rights and
the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1968 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 41;
1 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE "TRAvAUX PRI-PARATOIRES" (Council of Europe Doc. H.
(61) 4 (confidential)) 8-9, 16-17 (1961) [hereinafter cited as TRAVAUX PRiPARATOIRES].
See also EUR. CONSULT. Ass., MINUTES OF PROC. [hereinafter cited as MINUTES], 2d
Sess., at 526-28 (Aug. 16, 1950) (remarks of Mr. Beaufort).,
7. 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (1955). The Convention and Protocols are set out in
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COLLECTED TEXTS

ch. 1 (1971).
8. See, e.g., Draft prepared by the European Movement, Doc. INF/5/E/R at 4-5
(1949); MINUTES, 1st Sess., at 410-12, 416-18, 434-36, 444 (Aug. 19, 1949) (remarks
of Messrs. Lannung, Antonopoulos, Cingolani, Foster and Persico); MINUTES, 1st Sess.,
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The situation has developed since then. On December 16, 1966,
the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted an International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and a Covenant-accompanied by an Optional Protocol-on Civil and Political
Rights. 9 At first sight, these instruments are less closely related to the
Universal Declaration than to the European Convention. On their
coming into force,10 they will create real obligations; what is more;
they will place these obligations under the supervision of international
organs.
When the United Nations Covenants become effective will they
not pointlessly duplicate, or even conflict with the European Convention? To avoid any such risk, three courses are open to the Member
States of the Council of Europe: (1) abrogation of the European Convention; (2) refusal to sign or ratify the United Nations Covenants; or
(3) pursuance of coexistence.
Neither of the first two solutions would stand up to close examination. To abandon the European achievements for the sake of a universalist ideal would be tantamount to dropping the substance for the
shadow. In spite of incontestable merits, the Covenants suffer from an
inherent weakness in the way they are to be implemented; for example,
they do not provide for binding decisions comparable to those of the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and the European
Court of Human Rights (articles 32 and 53 of the Convention). Moreover, the Member States of the Council of Europe have a legitimate
interest in settling en famille any disputes that may arise among them
in the field of human rights: they benefit from a calmer atmosphere than
the often high-tempered mood of the United Nations. Additionally,
they enjoy the benefit of a European case law which has already helped
to define-and even enrich-their "common spiritual heritage." Thus,
there is little reason to abandon a regional system which has proved
its worth.
at 1158 (Sept. 7, 1949) (remarks of Mr. Teitgen); MINUTES, 1st Sess., at 1210-12,
1256 (Sept. 8, 1949) (remarks of Messrs. Serrarens and Teitgen); Committee on Legal
and Admin. Questions, Tsitgeri Report, Eur. Consult. Ass., 1st Sess., Doe. No. 77, 1
Docs. 198-99 paras.6 & 7, 204-05 arts. 1 &2 (1949).
9. G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doe. A/6316

(1966).
: 10. Thirty-five ratifications are needed for
Optional Pirto:6ol.' As of September 30, 1972
of Europe, '(Republic d),Cyprus, -Denmark and
the two last'named ha, e also r2.tifi~d the Optional

each of the Covenants and ten for the
three Member States of the Council
Sweden) have ratified the Covenants;
Protocol.
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Conversely, it would be a serious mistake to disdain the Covenants
through loyalty to the Convention. Such an attitude would not accord
with article 1, paragraph (c), of the Statute, and world public opinion
would not understand it. Further, on a few points, the Covenants are
more progressive than the Convention. Their institutional inferiority
is partly compensated for by a normative superiority in some respects,
from which individuals within the jurisdiction of the Member States
of the Council of Europe should profit. Ratification of the Covenants,
moreover, would offer these States a considerable advantage by enabling
them to exert a positive influence on the interpretation and application of the universal instruments.
The two extreme solutions having been disposed of, a middle
path-the coexistence of the Convention and the Covenants-remains
to be explored. This approach is evidently not without its difficulties as
the European Ministers of Justice had occasion to realize at their Fifth
Conference held in London on June 5-7, 1968. In the light of a report
concerning "the relations between the European Convention . . .and

the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" presented by Mr. P. Modinos, the then Deputy Secretary General of the
Council of Europe, they recommended to the Committee of Ministers
"that measures should be taken with a view to ensuring, in respect of
States which are Parties to both instruments, the harmonious functioning of these two systems for the international protection of Human
Rights."'"
The Committee of Ministers had not awaited this invitation to
act: as early as 1967, they had instructed the Committee of Experts on
Human Rights to study the problems arising from the coexistence of
the Convention and the Covenants. The experts completed their task
in 1969. On the basis of their conclusions, the Committee of Ministers
adopted, in 1970, a number of decisions which will be mentioned below
insofar as they have been made public.12
11.

Res. 2, 5th Conference of the European Ministers of Justice (1968). See also

Council of Europe Doe. CMJ (68) 9 (rev. 1968); Council of Europe Doc. CMJ (68)

CR at 56-90 (1968) (final) ; Modinos, supranote 6.
12. Eur. Consult. Ass., 22d Sess., Doc. No. 2795 at 21-23, 53-54, 4 Docs. (1970-71).
See also Eur. Consult. Ass., 18th Sess., Doc. No. 2069 at 12, 2 Does. (1966); Eur.
Consult. Ass., 19th Sess., Doc. No. 2228 at 9, 2 Does. (1967) and Doc. No. 2329 at 6,
9 Docs. (1967-68) ; Eur. Consult. Ass., 20th Sess., Doc. No. 2359 at 58, 1 Docs. (1968),
Doc. No. 2453 at 5-6, 8 Docs. (1968), Doc. No. 2489, 10 Does. (1968-69), Doc. No.
2505 at 2, 3, 9, 11, 12 Does. (1968-69), Doc. No. 2527, 15 Does. (1968-69); Eur.
Consult. Ass., 21st Sess., Doc. No. 2623 at 10-11, 6 Docs. (1969-70); Eur. Consult.
Ass., 23d Sess., Doc. No. 2962 at 11-16, 3 Docs. (1971-72); Eur. Consult. Ass., 23d
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. Both the Committee of Experts and the Committee of Ministers
considered separately:
I. the procedural aspect of the matter, in other words "the problems arising from the coexistence of the two systems of control provided
for by the European Convention and the U.N. Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights"' 3 ; and
II. the normative aspect, concerning "the problems arising from
the differences in the definition of the rights guaranteed in the two
instruments.'

14

This article examines these aspects of the coexistence in parts I
and II. In Part III, we shall endeavor to show the relationship between
the procedural and the normative. As in the Committee of Experts
study, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights will
scarcely be mentioned since it is mostly in connection with the European Social Charter of October 18, 1961 that its entry into force may
giverise to problems of "coexistence."' 5
I. THE PROCEDURAL ASPECT

With regard to the procedural aspect, a distinction must be drawn
between (A) applications or communications by States and (B) applications or communications by private persons ("individuals"). For each
of these two categories we shall try to review the relevant texts, problems
and solutions. In part (C), the possible "duplication" of a State application and an individual communication will be examined.
A. Applicationsand Communicationsby States
1. The texts.
According to article 24 of the Convention, "any High Contracting
Party may refer to the [European] Commission [of Human Rights],
through the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, any alleged
breach of the provisions of the Convention by another High Contracting Party."
Sess., Doc. No.3067 at 1-3, 13 Does. (1971-72); Eur.Consult. Ass., 20th Sess. (3d Part),
TMTS ADOPTED, Recommendation 548, par. 7(1) (a) (Jan. 1969); Eur. Consult. Ass.,

23d Sess. (2d Part), TEXTS ADOPTED, Recommendations
BuR.. CoNv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS Y.B. 106-08 (1967)

642 paras. 3-5 (Oct.1971); 10
[hereinafter cited as Y.B.]; 11

Y.B. 98-102 (1968) ; 12 Y.B. 132-34 (1969).
,13. 11 Y.B. 102 (1968).
14.- Id.
15. The examination of this matter has been placed on Council of Europe's intergovernmental work program for 1971-72 (item 424/2). See also Eur. Consult. Ass.,
23d Sess., Doc. No.2962 at 16-17, 3 Docs. (1971-72).
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The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("the Covenant")
does not go so far. Under the terms of its article 40:
"the States Parties ... undertake to submit reports on the measures

they, have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized [in the
Covenant] and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights,
[indicating] the factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the implementation of the... Covenant."
The Human Rights Committee provided for in article 28 of the
Covenant (the New York Committee) " "shall study" these reports.
It "shall transmit its [own] reports, and such general comments as it
may consider appropriate, to the States Parties," and will be entitled
to "transmit to the Economic and Social Council these comments
along with copies of the reports it [will have] received from States
Parties to the... Covenant."
Taken alone, such a reporting system can be easily reconciled with
the operation of article 24 of the Convention. However, the Covenant
adds in the first sentence of paragraph 1 of article 41, that "A State
Party... may at any time declare... that it recognizes the competence
of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect
that a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its
obligations under the ...Covenant."

This competence will be exercised only on condition of reciprocity
and after its acceptance by ten States. 17 In spite of its optional nature,
it is similar to the jurisdiction conferred by article 24 of the Convention
on the Strasbourg Commission: in both cases, a State alleges the violation of a treaty' 8 ; in both cases interest need not be shown and the
nationality of the "victim" is of no consequence.
The procedure applicable in the matter also recalls that laid
down in the Convention. The New York Committee, which will sit in
camera, will have to satisfy itself that the domestic remedies have beh
exhausted, and offer its "good offices.. . with a view to a friendly solution ...on the basis of respect for human rights and fundamental free16. The Committee will "normally meet at the Headquarters of the United Nations or at the United Nations Office at Geneva." Covenant, art. 37, para. 3.
17. Covenant, art. 41, paras. 1, 2. As of September 30, 1972, two Member States
of the Council of Europe (Denmark and Sweden) have made such a declaration.
18. In a sense, article 41 of the Covenant is even clearer in this respect ("a State
Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations") than the French
text of article 24 of the Convention ("qu'elle croira pouvoir 6tre imput"; in English,
"any alleged breach"). Notwithstanding their name, "communications" iall therefore
be real applications.
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doms."' 9 It will be empowered to request "any relevant information"
from the "States Parties concerned" who will have "the right to make
submissions orally and/or in writing."20 Finally, its proceedings will
result in the drafting of a report which will be "communicated to the
States Parties concerned." 21 The report will be confined, depending
whether the attempt at a friendly settlement succeeds or fails, "to, a
brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached" 22 or "to a brief
statement of the facts."' 23 On the latter point, the New York Committee's functions will be much more narrow than those of the Strasbourg
Commission: they will not include the expression of an opinion on
the existence or absence of a violation.24 Moreover, the Covenant does
not provide for any judicial or quasi-judicial ruling by an organ comRights and to the Committee
parable to the European Court of Human
25
of Ministers of the Council of Europe.
. If the European States ratify the Covenant and, in addition, accpt the competence of the New York Committee to deal with State
communications, will there be a risk of pointless duplication, or even
of, conflict, between article 41 of the Covenant and article 24 of the
Convention? To answer this, account must be taken of article 44 of
the Covenant and article 62 of the Convention:
Article 44 of the Covenant
The provisions for the implementation of the ... Covenant...
shall not prevent the States Parties... from having recourse to other
general or spe* procedures for settling a dispute in accordance with
26
cial international agreements in force between them.
Article 62 of the Convention
The High Contracting Parties agree that, except by special
agreement, they will not avail themselves of treaties, conventions
'or declarations in force between them for the purpose of submitting,
19. Compare Covenant, art. 41, para. 1 (d), (c), (e) with Convention, arts. 33,
26 & 28, para. b. See also Covenant, art. 42 (ad hoc Conciliation Commissions).
20. Compare Covenant, art. 41, para. 1 (J), (g) with Convention, art. 28, para. a.
21. Covenant, art. 41, para. 1 (h).
22. Compare Covenant, art. 41, para. 1 (h) (i) with Convention, art. 30.
23. Covenant, art. 41, para. 1 (h) (ii).
. 24. See Convention, art. 31.
. 25. Convention, § IV & art. 32. According to article 45 of the Covenant, the New
York Committee "shall submit to the General Assembly .of the United Nations, through
the Economic and Social Council, an annual report on its activities." See also Covenant,
art. 46.
26. Reference of a case to the International Court of Justice, for example.
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by way of petition, a dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of [the] Convention to a means of settlement other than
those provided for in this Convention.
2. The problems.
Do the articles quoted above rule out a free choice between the
"European" and the "universal" procedures or, if not, the duplication
of the latter and the former?
(a) Possibility of free choice between the two procedures
Article 62 of the Convention would not forbid European States
from bringing a matter before the New York Committee rather than the
Strasbourg Commission. Admittedly, it does not apply only to "treaties,
conventions or declarations" in force at the time the Convention took
effect. The opposite interpretation, which would exclude the Covenant
outright 27 but create complications, 28 is not dictated by the text, since
"in force" (French: existant) may very well be taken to mean "in force
at any time." Moreover, it would scarcely be in keeping with the indications to be found in the travaux prdparatoires,throughout which
the autonomy and regional character of the Convention were con29
stantly asserted with ever-increasing emphasis.
Despite this, article 62 concerns only "disputes arising out of the
interpretation or application" of the Convention, whereas a case referred to the New York Committee would relate to the Covenant even
if the provisions invoked were identical to a clause of the Convention.
Conversely, article 44 of the Covenant would leave States Parties
to the Convention free to lodge an application at Strasbourg rather
than New York; for the Convention is without doubt included among
the "special international agreements" mentioned.30
(b) Possibility of duplication of proceedings
Again, neither article 62 of the Convention nor article 44 of the
Covenant prohibits use by the States of the two procedures, whether
27. Except for States ratifying the Convention simultaneously with the Covenant
or later.
28. The dates of entry into force vary according to the instruments (Convention,
Protocol No. 1 and Protocol No. 4) and to the States.
29. Council of Europe Doe. CDH (69) 12 (1969) (confidential) which contains
preparatory work on Convention, art. 62. See also J. DE MEYER, LA CONVENTION
EUROPEENNE

DES

DROITS

DR

L'HoMmE ET LE

PACTE

INTERNATIONAL

RELATIF

AUX

20-21, 92-93 (1969). Compare with the discussion of
article 60 of the Convention at p. 210 infra.
30. Note that article 44 of the Covenant differs from article 62 of the Convention
in that the former uses terms which are both broad ("a dispute," even relating to the
DROITS CIVILS ET POLITIQUES

Covenant) and permissive ("shall not prevent").
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simultaneously or not. Furthermore, article 27, paragraph 1 (b), of
the Convention refers only to individual applications; it is hardly likely
that the Commission would apply it by analogy to applications from
States.31 As to the Covenant, it contains no rule similar to that laid
down in article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of its Optional Protocol,32 which
deals exclusively with individual communications. Whether still pending or not, proceedings instituted pursuant to article 24 of the Convention would therefore be no obstacle to the filing in New York of a
communication by (1) the State which had referred the same matter to
the European Commission, by (2) another State Party to the Convention, or by (3) a third State.
3. The solutions.
The European States would be wrong to be content with the
situation which would result from the texts, analyzed above. Firstly,
duplication of proceedings would lead to shocking consequences. Differences in assessment would almost inevitably occur between the New
York Committee and the Strasbourg bodies. Furthermore, the former
would in practice be given a right to look into, if not to censure, the
activities of the latter, who would in turn enjoy the same right. For instance, a State resorting to the New York Committee after having
vainly lodged an application under the Convention would appear to
be making a kind of appeal: it would in effect be asking the Committee
to uphold a claim which the Commission, Court or Committee of Ministers had declared inadmissible or ill-founded. This would undermine
the authority of institutions empowered by the Convention to make
binding and final decisions in their respective domains.3
It has been maintained that a proper approach to the problem of
duplication requires going beyond the "formal" distinctions between
obligatory sanctions and noncompulsory measures: according to some
authors, the "views" of the universal body might constitute as effective
a means of persuasion as regional decisions, provided they receive a
minimum of publicity. 34 That this opinion corresponds to a very "real31. The relevant text of this paragraph is quoted at p. 196 infra. See also note
59 infra.
32. Id.
33. Convention, arts. 27, 49, 50, 52, 53 & 32, para. 4. See also note 70 infra and
the first paragraph of section I (B) (2) (b) (i) infra.
34. E.g., Tardu, Quelques questions relatives a la coexistence des procidures
universelles et rgionales de plainte individuelle dans le domaine des Droits de l'Homme,
1971 HuBAN RIGHTS J. 589, 622 (1971) (referring to Vasak).
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istic conception of international life" seems rather doubtful. Of course,
a mere recommendation carries the same weight as an enforceable decision on occasion: a totalitarian State is inclined to attach as little
importance to the latter as to the former; strong political, economic or
military pressure on the part of Great Powers sometimes transforms a
recommendation into a de facto order, etc. Leaving aside these and
other equally extreme examples, we do believe that the possibility of a
legal decision-even if not used in a concrete case-is essential for
genuine international protection of human rights. Whatever its value,
publicity cannot suffice. The European system takes it into account,
8
but mainly for the more determinative phases of the procedure, a
fact which is not without significance.
As to full freedom of choice between the two procedures, it would
be scarcely reconcilable with the spirit of the Convention and of the
Council of Europe's Statute. The Council aims at "the achievement of
greater unity between its Members," particularly by "the maintenance
'
and further realization of human rights." Together its Members form
a fairly homogeneous family within which problems concerning human
rights have a good chance of being resolved in a less political atmosphere than at the United Nations. Unless they surrendered their option
to settle their disputes inter se at world-wide level, would they not run
the risk of impairing their privileged relationship? The European idea
would suffer thereby, and the cause of human rights would probably
fail to gain anything since the implementation system under the Convention is superior to that provided for in the Covenant.
Moreover, article 33 of the San Francisco Charter encourages the
regional settlement of interstate disputes. Although it mentions only
disputes "the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security," it would appear to apply
a fortiori to those involving no such danger since the fight for international peace and security figures among the fundamental tasks of
7
the United Nations.
In any event, the sole way of avoiding duplication of interstate
proceedings would seem to be the establishment of a "Europe prefer35. Convention, art. 32, para. 4; Rules of Court of the European Court of

Human Rights 18, 51, 52 [hereinafter cited as Court Rules], in COUNCIL OF EuaoPE,
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COLLECTED TEXTS ch. 3 (1971).
36. Compare the Convention Preamble and
art. 1 with U.N. CHARTER, art. 1.
37. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 1.

STATUTE OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
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ence" abolishing or reducing the governments' freedom of choice. Admittedly, the European States would debar the New York Committee
from dealing with a matter already examined or pending in Strasbourg
if they made an appropriate reservation with their declarations under
article 41 of the Covenant, 3 but this reservation would operate exclusively in the case of "Strasbourg followed by New York." As to the
Convention, we know it admits of duplication, particularly in the case
of "New York followed by Strasbourg"; furthermore, it does not
authorize the Contracting States to limit a posteriori the jurisdiction
9
defined in its article 24.
De lege ferenda, various means are conceivable to create the
"European preference" which appears to be needed. First of all, a resolution of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe could
invite the Member States to have recourse, as between themselves, only
to the "European" procedure with regard to the rights written into the
Convention as well as into existing and future Protocols. In other words,
they would be asked not to exercise their freedom of choice, and this
alone would tend to eliminate any duplication of proceedings in their
mutual relations. 40 Whether couched in the form of a recommendation 41 or not, a resolution of this kind would not place Member States
under any legal obligation but merely advocate a common policy or, at
most, unofficially record a "gentlemen's agreement."
38. See mutatis mutandis section I (B) (3) infra, as from third paragraph;
Modinos, supra note 6, at 67-68.
39. According to article 64 of the Convention, a reservation has to be made when
signing, or depositing the instrument of ratification, and must relate to a law not in
conformity with a provision of the Convention. How could these conditions be fulfilled
in the instant case? Similarly, a reservation to article 24 would not satisfy the requirements of general international law by reason, if nothing else, of its belatedness, unless
it came from a State ratifying the Convention either for the first time (for example,
France or Switzerland) or after having denounced it. Cf. Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, art. 19 (1969). Even then, it would have
to be ascertained whether the special rules of article 64 of the Convention do not exclude
the application of general international law on reservations. Cf. article 19, paragraph b
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See also Khol, Fragen der Systeme

internationaler Verfahren zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und ihrer Konkurrenz, in
190 (1968).
40. States not parties to the Convention would, of course, not be affected. They
would therefore be entitled to refer to the New York Committee a matter which a
Contracting State or a private person had brought before the Strasbourg Commission.
This would result in a rather unfortunate "relative duplication" which could hardly be
avoided by legal provisions.
41. Adopted unanimously, as required by article 20 of the Statute of the Council
of Europe. It has been suggested that a tacit agreement would suffice. Marcus-Helmons,
Protection universelle ou rigionale des Droits de l'Homme?, 1968 REVUE GiMRALE
DEUTSCHLAND, EUROPA UND DIE MENSCHENRECEITE

BELGE

97.
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An international treaty, identical in content to the said resolution,
would undoubtedly offer much stronger guarantees because the "European preference" would rest upon precise commitments and not simply on wishes. If necessary, it could be concluded between a limited
number of Member States since-unlike the Third and Fifth Protocols
-it would not amend the Convention.4
One could also think of a network of reservations by which the
European States would remove from the competence conferred on the
New York Committee by article 41 of the Covenant the examination
of any complaint lodged by one against another, unless it concerned
rights which the Convention and its Protocols do not protect. Having
regard to article 44 of the Covenant and article 33 of the San Francisco
Charter, such reservations would not be "incompatible with the object and purpose" of the Covenant. However, in the absence of the
treaty suggested above, they would have a rather precarious efficacy in
law: being the expression of the unilateral will of States, they could
be withdrawn by them; if they were made in addition to this treaty,
they would probably prove superfluous.
The entry into force of an international treaty would take time,
and in the interim, reservations, or a resolution by the Committee of
Ministers would have a certain usefulness which would not subsequently
be completely lost if some European States refused to subscribe to a
multilateral agreement.
Whatever its legal form, should the "European preference" go
as far as "exclusivity"? Should it apply to every interstate dispute
capable of being validly referred to the Strasbourg Commission, or only
as a rule? Should the European States remain free to petition the New
York Committee in exceptional circumstances, even inter se and in respect of rights listed in the Convention and Protocols? In short, should
they maintain an escape clause? In the present instance, one would wish
strictness to prevail over flexibility.
4. Decision of the Committee of Ministers.
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe chose the
42. Cf. Eissen, Les mesures provisoires dans la Convention europlenne des Droits
de l'Homme, 1969 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 256-57. In addition to reservations to article 41
of the Covenant, Khol favors a revision of article 62 of the Convention. Khol, supra note
39, at 191. One must remember, however, that Protocols Nos. 3 and 5, modifying five
articles of the Convention, came into effect only a few years after they were opened to
the signature of Member States (the respective signature-effective dates being May 6,
1963 and Sept. 21, 1970 for Protocol No. 3 and Jan. 20, 1966 and Dec. 20, 1971 for
Protocol No. 5). Thus a less burdensome procedure appears preferable.
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first of the solutions studied above. On May 15, 1970, the Ministers'

Deputies adopted Resolution (70) 17 reproduced below:
U.N. Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights and the European
Convention on Human Rights: Procedurefor dealing
with inter-state complaints
The Committee of Ministers,
Considering that, on 16 December 1966, the General Assembly
of the United Nations, by its Resolution 2200 (XXI), adopted the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
Considering that the, Covenant on Civil and Political, Rights.
sets out in its Article 41 an optional procedure under which a State
Party may bring to the attention of the U.N. Human Rights Committee a claim that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant;
Considering that Article 24 of the European Convention on
Human Rights has already established a procedure whereby-a Contracting Party may refer to the European Commission of Human
Rights any alleged breach of the provisions of that Convention-by another Contracting Party;
Considering that there are a certain number of rights W~hich in
substance are covered both by the U.N. Covenant and by the European
Convention;
Considering that the procedure instituted by the European Convention provides an effective system for the protection of human
rights, including binding decisions by the Court of Human Rights or
by the Committee of Ministers;
Recognising the value of the procedure establishedby the U.N.
Covenant for the protection of rights not included in the European
Convention-and its Protocols;I
Considering that Article 44 of the U.N. Covenant provides that
its provisions shall not prevent States Parties from having recourse
to other methods of settlement of disputes, and that under Article 62
of the European Convention the Contracting Parties agree that they
will not, except by special agreement, submit a dispute arising out of
the interpretation or application of the Convention to a means of
settlement other than those provided for in the Convention;
Considering, however, that differences of opinion appear to exist
as regards the exact scope of the obligation resulting from Article 62;
Considering that Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations
emphasizes the importance of regional settlement of interstate disputes,
Declares that, as long as the problem of interpretation of Article 62
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of the European Convention is not resolved, States Parties to the Convention which ratify or accede to the U.N. Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and make a declaration under Article 41 of the Covenant should normally utilise only the procedure established by the
European Convention in respect of complaints against another Contracting Party to the European Convention (or its Protocols) and
by the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it being understood that the U.N. procedure may be invoked in relation to rights
not guaranteed in the European Convention (or its Protocols) or in relation to States which are not Parties to the European Convention.
As between Governments, the above resolution aims not only at
preventing the duplication of the "European" and of the "universal"
procedures, but also at establishing a system or practice of "preference" for the former. The use of the adverb "normally" in the last paragraph, however, seems to imply that this preference will not go as far
as exclusivity. In addition, the Committee apparently does not contemplate the conclusion of an international agreement creating legal
obligations; it confines itself, at least for the present, to advocating a
common policy. Resolution (70) 17 has not even the character of a
recommendation. On the other hand, it is framed in broad enough
terms to cover future Protocols, if any, in addition to the Convention
and the existing Protocols.
B. Applications and Communications by PrivatePersons
1. The texts.
According to article 25, paragraph 1, of the Convention:
the Commission may receive petitions addressed to the SecretaryGeneral of the Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a
violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set
forth in [the] Convention, [provided that the respondent State] has
declared that it recognises the competence of the Commission to receive such petitions.
As to the Covenant, it is supplemented by an Optional Protocol of
which article 1 is worded as follows:
A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a party to the present
Protocol recognises the competence of the Committee to receive and
consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction
who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any
of the rights set forth in the Covenant ....
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"Subject to the entry into force of the Covenant, [the Optional
Protocol] shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit . . . of the tenth instrument of ratification or instrument

of accession." 43 The competence it will confer on the New York
Committee resembles that bestowed by article 25 of the Convention
on the Strasbourg Commission: in both cases, a private person complains of a wrong which he claims to have suffered. Similarities are
also to be noticed with regard to the procedure applicable. The New
York Committee, which will sit in camera, will have such functions as:
verifying the exhaustion of "all available domestic remedies, '44 dismissing any communication 'which is anonymous, abusive or incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant, 45 receiving "written explanations or statements" from the respondent government and "written information made available" by the latter and by the individual
applicant, 46 etc.
The Optional Protocol, however, proves more discreet than the
Convention-and even the Covenant 4 7 -in respect'to the outcome of
the case. It does not expressly mention the attempt to reach a friendly
settlement, 48 nor specify the nature of the "views" (French: constatations) which the Committee "shall forward... to the State Party concerned and to the individual. '49 What is more, it provides for no judicial or quasi judicial ruling by an organ comparable to the European
43. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
art. 9, para. 1, Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Optional Protocol]. See supra note 10. Compare Optional Protocol,
art. 9, para. 1 with Convention, art. 25, para. 4, the requirements of which (six acceptances) were met on July 5, 1955. Out of fifteen Parties to the Convention, eleven
are presently bound by declarations pursuant to paragraph 1 of article 25.
44. Compare Optional Protocol, arts. 2 and 5, paras. 2b, 3 with Convention, arts.
26, 33, & 27, para. 3.
45. Compare Optional Protocol, art. 3 with Convention, art. 27, paras. la, 2. It
should be noted in passing that the Optional Protocol, unlike articles 26 & 27, paragraph
2, of the Convention, does not include "manifest il-foundedness" and "belatedness"
in its list of grounds of inadmissibility.
46. Compare Optional Protocol, arts. 4 and 5, para. 1 with Convention, art. 28,
para. a. The Optional Protocol differs from the Convention, the Strasbourg Commission's Rules of Procedure and article 41, paragraph ig of the Covenant, in that the
Protocol does not seem to envisage oral hearings.
47. See text at section I (A) (1) infra.
48. Compare with Convention, arts. 30, 47 and 28, para. b. On the other hand,
according to article 4, paragraph 2, of the Optional Protocol, the respondent State
shall "submit to the Committee . . . the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by
that State." See also Tardu, supra note 34, at 596-97 (about article 5, paragraph 4).
49. Compare Optional Protocol, art. 5, para. 4, with Convention, arts. 30, .31.
On this topic, see the interesting observations of Tardu, supra note 34, at 597.
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Court of Human Rights and to the Committee of Ministers of the
1 1
Council of Europe."0 ,
Will there be a risk of pointless duplication, or even of conflict,
between the Optional Protocol-if the European States ratify it-and
article. 25 of the Convention? To answer this, account must be taken of
article .5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol and article 27,
paragraph 1 (b) , of the Convention.
Article 5, paragraph2(a), of the OptionalProtocol
The Committee shall not consider any communication from an
individual unless it has ascertained that:
(a) the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement;
Article 27, paragraph1(b), of the Convention
The Commission shall not deal with any petition submitted under
Article 25 which
(b) is substantially the same as a matter which has ... already
been submitted to another procedure of international investigation
or settlement and if it contains no relevant new information.
2. The problems.
(a) Possibility of free choice between the two procedures.
If a State were to recognize the right of individual petition both
at "world" and at "European" levels, persons subject to its jurisdiction
would enjoy complete freedom of choice between the two procedures.
This emerges, at least implicitly, from the texts quoted in the preceding
paragraph. Furthermore, article 62 of the Convention does not govern
individual applications or communications. 51
(b) Possibility of duplication of proceedings.
(i) "New York followed by Strasbourg."
The hypothesis of a communication to the New York Committee
50. Convention, §IV & art. 32. Article 6 of the Optional Protocol prescribes that
"the Committee shall include in its annual report under article 45 of the Covenant a
summary of its activities under the . . . Protocol." See also supra note 25; Tardu, supra
note 34, at 597-98.
51. See Convention, art. 62 ("the High Contracting Parties," "avail themselves,"
"between them"); Council of Europe Doe. CDH (69) 12 at 31 (1969) (confidential).
This opinion is shared by Tardu, supra note 34, at 599.
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being followed by an application to the Strasbourg. Commission has
been described as "probably theoretical to a large. extent" since,, according to article 26 of the Convention, reference to the latter body
must occur "within a period of six months from the date on which the
final [domestic] decision was taken" ' 52 This opinion is not qui te convincing: an individual might well seize the European Commission after
the New York Committee but still before the expiration of the said
time limit. This might occur, for example, if he did not await the outcome of the United Nations proceedings or if his communication had
53
been dismissed because he had not yet exhausted domestic remedies.
This being so, would an individual communication addressed to the
New York Committee constitute a "matter" (French: requite) and
would it initiate a "procedure of international investigation or .settlement," for the purposes of article 27, paragraph 1.(b), of the Convention? Should an individual application to the Strasbourg .Commission
be considered, in certain circumstances, "substant.'ally the same" as
such a communication-although based on the Convention and not
on the Covenant?
Each of these three questions calls for an affirmative reply. First
of all, communications lodged by virtue of the. Optional Protocol
would come from individuals claiming to be the victims..of a violation of a right, and they would set in motion proceedings involving
the hearing of both parties 54; they would thus be real requites, and a
fortiori "matters," within the meaning of the French and English texts
of article 27, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention. Secondly, the New
York Committee would apparently have powers of investigation if not
of settlement, despite the fact that its functions would be less extensive
for individual than for State communications. 55 Finally, paragraph
1 (b) of article 27 would serve little useful purpose if it related only to
matters concerning the interpretation or application of the. Convention. 8 This is true because the Strasbourg Commission is the sole
52. Tardu, supra note 34, at 599.
53. Incidentally, one must question whether an application.,to, the Strasbourg
Commission could be "substantially the- same" as a previous communication rejected
by the New York Committee for the mere reason of a procedural defectcapable of
being cured, as in the last mentioned case.
54. Yet this caractare contradictoireis perhaps less mnkked .-than ir1 the Convention.
Compare Optional Protocol, arts. 4, para. 2 and 5, para. 1. with Convention,.art, 28, para.

a. See also supra note 18; section I (B) (1) supra.
55. See sections I (A) (1) and I (B) (1) supra; Tardu, supra note.34; at 601.
56. See section I (A) (2) (a) supra.discussing article 62 of the Convention:.
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international organ of investigation or settlement before which private
persons may invoke the Convention.
Article 27, paragraph I (b) , therefore, precludes duplication of proceedings involving recourse to Strasbourg after New York 7 ; it thereby
sanctions in its field, as it were, the maxim: "He who has chosen one
way cannot have recourse to another."5 8 It makes no distinction according to whether the other "procedure of international investigation or settlement" is still Pending or has been completed: the phrase
"which ... has already been submitted" does not lend itself to such
a distinction.5 9
To be "substantially the same" as an individual communication to
the New York Committee, should an application made pursuant to
article 25 of the Convention not only relate to the same facts and allege violation of the same right, but also be filed by the same person?
In other words, is the objective criterion of identity of cause and object sufficient in this respect, or must it be combined with the subjective criterion of identity of parties? ° While the term "matter" in the
English text of article 27, paragraph 1 (b), may be taken to support the
former solution, the French version (requite) and general principles
governing litispendentia and res judicata plead rather for the latter
which, in addition, probably better accords with the spirit of the Con57. Tardu questions-without reaching firm conclusions-whether such duplication
is not equally forbidden by the Optional Protocol and article 44 of the Covenant. Tardu,
supra note 34, at 599-600.

58. "Electa una via, non datur recursus ad alteram." 10 Toullier, Dr. Civ. Fr.,

no. 170 (1837). But see note 75 infra.
59. This opinion is shared by De Meyer and-with some hesitation-by Tardu.
J. DE MEYER, supra note 29, at 95. Tardu, supra note 34, at 601-02. The American
Convention on Human Rights is even clearer in this respect. Once in force, it would
oblige the Inter-American Commission to declare inadmissible any petition or communication, whether from a State or a private person, the subject of which was "pending before another international procedure for settlement" or which was "substantially
the same as one previously studied by the Commission or another international organization." American Convention on Human Rights, arts. 46, para. 1(c) and 47, para. (d),

b.A.S. Official icdids,'OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65 (1970).
60. See also supra note 53. In his recent article, Tardu wonders whether the
Strasbourg Commission ought to decline jurisdiction whenever an individual application
contained information which another international body of investigation or settlement
(for example the U.N.-I.L.O. Special Committee on Forced Labor) was taking or had
taken just as an aspect of a broader problem or as mere evidence of a general situation. Tardu, supra note 34, at 611-13. This question falls outside the scope of this
paper since it does not appear to concern the Covenant and Optional Protocol; but it
deserves negative reply--a conclusion which Tardu himself reaches. Id. at 621. It seems
obvious that such an application could not be considered "substantially the same" as a
requte, and even as a matter, already submitted to another international procedure.
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vention.61 No doubt the Strasbourg Commission will eventually be
62
called upon to pronounce on the point.
(ii) "Strasbourg followed by New York:"
On the other hand, duplication of proceedings in the case of
"Strasbourg followed by New York" would clash with no provision of
the Convention.6 Nor would it be prohibited in clear terms by article
5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol. Of course, resort to the
European Commission does initiate "another procedure of international investigation or settlement" and a study of the "travaux
prdparatoires" would confirm, if necessary, that individual applications addressed to this organ have not been overlooked. Taken literally,
however, article 5, paragraph 2 (a), would operate only in case of
litispendentia. True, it may be hoped that the New York Committee
would give that provision a broad interpretation resting on a reasoning
by analogy or a fortiori, but a wish affords little legal certainty. It is
safer to begin from the hypothesis that the ground of inadmissibility set out in article 5, paragraph 2 (a), would have a delaying and
not definitive effect.6 4 Even litispendentia would perhaps not prevent
the New York Committee from dealing with an individual communication whenever it found that the other proceedings of international investigation or settlement-for example, at Strasbourg-were "unreasonably prolonged": such view has been put forward in the light of
61. Adopting a purely objective criterion would allow a State to instigate reference
of a case to the New York Committee by individual A, and then use this as an argument in order to obtain the dismissal of the "European" application lodged by individual
B. The more effective action of the Strasbourg organs would thus be paralyzed.
62. On August 28, 1959, the European Commission of Human Rights declared
Application 499/59 to be "substantially the same" as Application 397/58, which had
already been examined by it-not "already ... submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement"-even though the parties were not identical. It
should be noted, however, that the second applicant was the mother of the applicant in
the earlier action. App. No. 499/59, 2 Y.B. 397-400 (1959). More recently, the Commission applied article 27, paragraph lb of the Convention, in spite of the fact that
the parties were not altogether identical. The second application (App. No. 3413/67,.
unpublished decision of Dec. 16, 1968) had been lodged by both the author-of the
first application (App. No. 2369/64, 23 COLL. OF DECISIONS OF THE EUR. COMM'N OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 21-25 (1964)) and a company of which this applicant was a major
shareholder. These are isolated decisions. The Commission does 'not usually base itself
on article 27, paragraph 1 when rejecting an application which relates to the same
matter as a previous complaint, brought by a different individual, which has been
judged inadmissible or ill-founded by the Commission, Court or Committee of Ministers.
See, e.g., App. No. 2333/64, 11 Y.B. 264/68 (1968); App. No. 2518/65, 8 Y.B. 374
(1965); App. No. 1135/61, 6 Y.B. 202 (1963); App. No. 924/60, 6 Y.B. 168-70 (1963.);
App. No. 493/59, 4 Y.B. 312-14 (1961). See also Khol, supra note' 39, at 184.
63. But see the doubts expressed by Tardu, supranote 34, at 606-07.
64. Compare with text accompanying notes 57-59 supra,,
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the "travaux priparatoires"and of the English text of article 5, paragraph 2 (a) _65
Moreover, might not the coexistence of the Optional Protocol
with article 25 of the Convention lead to positive or negative conflicts
of jurisdiction? Suppose, for example, that at a given time the same
matter was pending before both the New York Committee and the
Strasbourg Commission. Would not competence be declined by the
former under article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol, and
equally by the latter pursuant to article 27, paragraph 1 (b), of the
Convention? To avoid such an unfortunate result, would the date of
sending (or receipt) of the communication be compared with that of
the application? What would happen if the dates coincided? One author
considers this hypothesis "rather theoretical": according to him, the
Strasbourg Commission ought to dismiss the application under article
27, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention so that the "matter" no longer
"being examined" elsewhere within the meaning of article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol, could thenceforth be dealt with
by the New York Committee.6" His opinion, we submit, rests on a
questionable-although not implausible-prognosis of the way in which
the two bodies would carry out their duties. The individual communication and application might well both be rejected because the New
York Committee and the Strasbourg Commission had not waited for,
or did not know of, one another's decision. Assuming the Strasbourg
Commission learned of the New York ruling in time, should it nevertheless hold that the matter had "already been submitted to another
procedure" etc. and, if so, that the said ruling was no "relevant new
information" for the purposes of article 27, paragraph 1 (b), of the
Convention? Presumably not67; but if it did, there would be a negative
conflict of jurisdiction.
Alternatively, if rejection by the New York Committee under
article. 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol was brought to the
65. Tardu, supra note 34, at 604-05. From the information supplied by the treaty
division of the legal services of the United Nations Secretariat it is clear, however, that
at least in the English original of the Protocol the sentence "This shall not be the rule
where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged" is part of subparagraph (b) of article 5, paragraph 2, and does not refer to subparagraph (a).
Furthermore, the provision was adopted on the basis of an English draft of these lines.
Tardu evidently relied on a misleading copy of the English text (perhaps document A/
CONF. 32/4, at page 17) in which the sentence was presented so as to create a
possibility of ambiguity.

66. Id. at 611.
67. See mutatis mutandis note 53 supra.

PROBLEMS OF COEXISTENCE

attention of the Strasbourg Commission after the latter's finding of
inadmissibility based on article 27, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention, could a fresh application validly invoke it as "relevant new information"? This would eliminate the negative conflict ex post and
we are inclined to favor a reply in the affirmative. However, this reply
is not self evident.
It might also happen that the Strasbourg Commission would defer
its decision pending that of the New York Committee, and vice versa.
This would result in a "latent" positive conflict.6
Finally, how are the words "the same matter" (French: la meme
question) to be understood? For two "matters," raised respectively in an
individual communication and in an application "being examined"
at Strasbourg, to be "the same" in the view of the New York Committee,
would identity of parties be one of the prerequisites?
3. The solutions.
To form an opinion of the situation which would result from the
texts analyzed above, we should consider first whether it would be
wise to grant full freedom of choice between the two procedures. By
addressing themselves to the New York Committee, individuals would
run the risk of prejudicing their own cause as the cases they submitted
on the world scene might have had a better chance of being settled
to their satisfaction before the Strasbourg organs. The respondent
States would lose the advantage of the calm atmosphere in which proceedings instituted at European level usually take place. In any event,
the ideal way to escape duplication of international remedies, together
with the ensuing problems and difficulties, would obviously be either
not to ratify the Optional Protocol at all, or to accept it only with regard
to communications relating to rights which the Convention and the
Protocols thereto do not guarantee.
Yet a negative or very restrictive attitude on the part of the European States would hardly accord with their democratic principles,
would blatantly contradict the generous standpoint adopted by many
of them at the United Nations, would render ratification of the Covenant almost without effect, and would be badly received outside. Moreover, it would be the victim of an alleged violation who would suffer the
68. As to positive conflicts due to lack of information, see notes 73-75 infra and
the accompanying text.
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most if he "followed the wrong scent" by preferring New York to
Strasbourg. The European States would be overdoing it if they were
to establish themselves as protectors, even well intentioned, of the
procedural interests of persons under their jurisdiction. It does not
seem that they should deny to such persons freedom to choose between the two procedures. 69
The same cannot be said of duplication, the dangers of which
have already been stressed.70 As we have shown above, duplication is
prevented by the Convention in the case of "New York followed by
Strasbourg." To avoid duplication in the opposite direction, a declaration or reservation might be used.
One could think first of a declaration appended by the various
European States to their instruments ratifying the Optional Protocol.
This declaration would indicate that in these States' view article 5,
paragraph 2 (a), applies not only in every case of litispendentia7' but
also-subject to "relevant new information"-after closure of the other
"procedure of international investigation or settlement" devoted to
the examination of "the same matter."
Unfortunately, such a declaration of interpretation would not
be an absolute bar to negative conflicts of jurisdiction.7 2 Moreover, the
69. Contra, Khol, supra note 39, at 190-91. In November and December, 1966,
ten Member States of the Council of Europe supported recognition of a right of individual communication at meetings of the Third Committee of the United Nations
General Assembly. (These States were: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland,
Ireland, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom.) All of them except
France-which has not even ratified the Convention-have accepted the Strasbourg
Commission's competence to deal with individual applications.
70. See mutatis mutandis section I (A) (3) supra. Commenting on the possible
"differences in assessment" between the New York Committee and the Strasbourg
organs, Tardu suggests that "appropriate mutual consultation" would very much reduce
the risk of "conflicts of evaluation." Tardu, supra note 34, at 607-10, 621-25. Whatever
the position under the Covenant, Optional Protocol and future rules of the New York
Committee, the fundamental principle of secrecy of deliberations would seem to forbid
the Strasbourg Commission and Court to engage in real consultations about pending
cases with the Committee in hope of preventing contradictory findings. Cf. Court Rule
19; Rules of Procedure of the European Commision of Human Rights 27 [hereinafter
cited as Commission Rules], in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, COLLECTED TEXTS ch. 2 (1971). What could perhaps be done would not
exceed an exchange of mere information on the existence and general content of a
given application or communication, the stage of the proceedings, etc. These reciprocal
"measures for obtaining information" (see the title to Court Rule 38 referred to by
Tardu) would hardly suffice to produce a fully satisfactory result. In the final analysis,
therefore, Tardu's reflections appear to furnish additional evidence of the need to avoid
duplication of proceedings.
71. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
72. See text following note 65 supra.
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New York Committee would have difficulty verifying the admissibility
of an individual communication under article 5, paragraph 2 (a), in
combination with the declaration concerned. Would it be content with
the silence or unilateral assertions of the complainant? Would it demand an attestation from the respondent State 73 or the Commission? 74
Would it ex officio ask that State, or the Secretariat General of the
Council of Europe, to supply it with the necessary information? The
wording of article 5, paragraph 2 (a) ("unless it has ascertained"),
appears to suggest that the Committee would be under an obligation
to take an active role, but it might be useful to try to secure guarantees in this respect.7 5
Moreover, the New York Committee might not feel bound by an
interpretation contrary to a clear text. In actual fact, article 5, paragraph 2 (a), deals solely with litispendentia;6 it would be pointless
to strive at lending it a meaning it does not bear. Consequently, a mere
declaration would only provide a hazardous solution.
Reservations would be necessary if consideration of "matters"
previously raised in Strasbourg were to be removed more surely from
the competence of the New York Committee.7 7 They would cover the
Convention, as well as its existing and future Protocols, and specify
how the European States understand the phrase "the same matter."78
They should be deemed "compatible with the object and purpose" of
the Optional Protocol, for they would be in harmony with the spirit of
article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of this Protocol, article 44 of the Covenant
79
and article 33 of the San Francisco Charter.
Certain discussions which took place in the Third Committee
of the United Nations General Assembly have been thought to cast
73. This State would not necessarily know of an application introduced against
it in Strasbourg. See Commission Rule 45.
74. As a rule, the Commission's proceedings are secret. See Convention, art. 33.
Cf. mutatis mutandis supranote 70.

75. Conversely, how would the Strasbourg Commission verify compliance with
article 27, paragraph lb, of the Convention? The New York Committee's proceedings
would as a rule be secret and the respondent State would not necessarily know of a
communication lodged against it. See Optional Protocol, arts. 5, para. 3 and 4, para. 1
(opening words) ; cf. mutatis mutandissupra note 70.
76. See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
77. See J. DE MEYER, supra note 29, at 95-96; Marcus-Helmons, supra note 41,

at 98.
78. See text following note 68 supra.
79. See also mutatis mutandis section I (A) (3)

supra. There is, of course, no

question of invoking the letter of these provisions, as Tardu apparently believes is done.
Tardu, supra note 34, at 610.
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doubt on the validity of such reservations."0 Quite apart from the
5 ' the docurather limited use to be made of the travaux prdparatoires,
ments referred to in this connection are of only indirect relevance because they concern the actual text of article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the
Optional Protocol and of article 44 of the Covenant, not the admissibility of reservations about which both of these instruments remain silent.
The question would have to be settled in accordance with "customary
international law, as codified to some extent by articles 19 to 23 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.18 2 If their partnerspotential or actual-raised too many and strong objections, the European States might in practice be led either to refrain from ratifying the
Optional Protocol, or to denounce it (article 12). We trust that so
unfortunate a situation-for which they could in no way be blamed
considering their far-reaching regional achievements-is highly unlikely
to occur.
The reservation advocated here would not of itself dispose of all
problems (negative conflicts of jurisdiction, exchange of information
between the New York Committee and the Strasbourg Commission),
and it would be wrong to shut our eyes to this fact. It would, however,
constitute the least harmful solution.
4. Decision of the Committee of Ministers.
In May 1970:
The Committee of Ministers ...agreed that the acceptance of
the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights by States which... accepted the right of individual
petition under the European Convention would produce the result
that an individual who alleges violation of a right guaranteed both by
the European Convention and by the United Nations Covenant
would have the choice of initiating proceedings under either procedure. The Committee considered it reasonable that the individual
should have such a choice. The Committee also considered, on the
80. Tardu, supra note 34, at 610 (to be read in conjunction with pages 602-06).
81. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31, 32,

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969).

82. Tardu, supra note 34, at 610. Special attention should be paid to article 20,
paragraph 4(b) ("an objection by another contracting State to a reservation does not
preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States
unless a contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting State") and article 21,
paragraph 3 ("When a State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into
force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the
reservation relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation"), of the Vienna Convention.
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other hand, that an applicant should not be able to bring the same
case under both procedures either at the same time or successively.
In order to prevent the possibility of successive applications to
the European Commission and the U.N. Committee, member States
of the Council of Europe which sign or ratify the Optional Protocol
might wish to make a declaration, at the moment of signing or ratifying, whose effect would be that the competence of the U.N. Human
Rights Committee would not extend to receiving and considering
individual complaints relating to cases which are being or already
have been examined under the procedure provided for by the European Convention. Indeed, Article 5 (2) of the U.N. Optional Protocol
already contains a provision partially to this effect. Such a declaration
should only cover complaints of violations of rights which in substance are covered by the two instruments, and not complaints of violation of rights not guaranteed in the European Convention.
The Committee of Ministers... therefore decided to transmit to
member States a text drafted by the Committee of Experts on these
lines, so that Governments may use it, if they wish, either as a declaration of interpretation or as a reservation, when ratifying the83 Optional
Protocol to the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Thus the Committee of Ministers is of the opinion that private
persons should be free to choose New York instead of Strasbourg if
they so desire. It restricts itself to expressing its anxiety to avoid duplication of proceedings. To that end, it advises Member States to insert
either a declaration of interpretation or a reservation into their instruments of ratification of the Optional Protocol. It does not indicate
whether or not it holds the latter solution to be better than the former,
nor which meaning it would like to see given to the words "the same
question" in article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol.
C. The Possible Duplication of an Application by a State and an
Individual Communication
What would happen if the same case were brought before the
Strasbourg Commission by a State acting in pursuance of article 24 of
the Convention, and before the New York Committee by an individual
availing himself of the Optional Protocol? 4 The State application
83, Eur. Consult. Ass., 22d Sess., Doc. No. 2795 at 22-23, 4 Docs. (1970-71). The
two Member States which had ratified the Optional Protocol as of September 30, 1972,
bad made a reservation rather than a declaration of interpretation.
84. The converse hypothesis (an individual application and a communication by
a State) would in principle be ruled out from the start if the European States undertook not to have recourse to the New York Committee inter se. Cf. text following note
39 supra. See also Khol, supranote 39, at 184.
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would meet on that account with no obstacle in either the Convention
or the Covenant. 5 As for the communication, would it be dismissed
by the New York Committee under article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the
Optional Protocol? It does not seem so: the two bodies really would
not be taking cognizance of "the same matter" unless the complainant
State had recourse to Strasbourg not for the sake of its own rights or
of the general interest, but exclusively in defense of the rights of the
person who had appealed to New York. This might be one more reason
to wish that the European States should specify, preferably by means of
reservations, their understanding of the words "the same matter." The
Committee of Ministers does not appear to have paid attention to this
particular question. 6
II. THE NORMATIVE AsPECT
Close comparison of the normative clauses of the Covenant with
those of the Convention and Protocols indicates both similarities and
a number of occasionally striking differences. As this work has already
been carried out in great detail by others, including the Committee of
Experts whose report on this subject was made public by the Committee
of Ministers in June 1970,87 a few summary indications of the differences will suffice.
Let us notice first that the Covenant aims at protecting several
rights about which the Convention and Protocols do not say a single
word:
(1) all peoples' right "of self-determination" and of free disposal "of
their natural wealth and resources" (article 1) ;
(2) right of everyone deprived of his liberty to be "treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person" (article 10)

;88

(3) everyone's right "to recognition everywhere as a person before
the law" (article 16) ;g9
85. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
86. Eur. Consult. Ass., 22d Sess., Doc. No. 2795 at 21-23, 53-54, 4 Docs. (1970-71).
87. Council of Europe Doc. H (70) 7 (1970); Eur. Consult. Ass., 22d Sess., Doc.
No. 2795 at 22, 4 Docs. (1970-71). See also Modinos, supra note 6, at 57-64; J. Dn
MEYER, supra note 29, at 24-83; Danelius, Which Rights Should Be Protected?, Report
submitted to the Vienna Parliamentary Conference on Human Rights of October 1971,
Council of Europe Doc. AS/Coll. DH (71)3 (provisional ed. 1971).
88. On the guarantees offered by the Convention in this connection, see CoUNCIL
OF EUROPE, SECRETARIAT, HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRISON (Case-law topics ser.) (1971).
89. See the explanatory report on Protocol No. 4 to the Convention, Council of
Europe Doc. H (65) 16, para. 35 (1965).
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(4) prohibition of "any propaganda for war" and "of any advocacy
of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement
to discrimination, hostility or violence" (article 20) ;90
(5) the family being entitled "to protection by society and the State"
(article 23, paragraph 1) ;91
(6) the right of every child to "measures of protection," to a name
and to a nationality (article 24) ;92
(7) right of every citizen "to take part in the conduct of public affairs"
and "to have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country" (paragraphs (a) and (c) of article 25) ;93
(8) equality before the law (article 26) ;94
(9) rights of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities (article 27) .5
Conversely, three rights guaranteed at the European level are
not covered by the Covenant: the right to peaceful enjoyment of one's
possessions (article 1 of Protocol Number 1), the right to education
(first sentence of article 2 of the same Protocol) 96 and a national's right
not to be expelled from the territory of his State (article 3, paragraph 1,
of Protocol Number 4).
Rights appearing on both the "universal" and the "European"
97
lists are rarely defined in identical terms.
While many of these drafting differences are probably of little
90. See Eur. Consult. Ass., 17th Sess. (3d Part), TEXTS ADOPTED, Recommendation
453 (1966); Committee of Ministers, Resolution (68) 30 (1968).
91. But see Council of Europe, European Social Charter, arts. 4, para. 1 and 16, 17
19, E.T.S. No. 35 (1961).
92. But see id. at arts. 7, 9, 10, 17.
93. See Eur. Consult. Ass., 11th Sess., Doc. No. 1057 at 8, para. 6, 6 Docs. (1959);
Eur. Consult. Ass., 21st Sess., Doc. No. 2703 at 29-31, paras. 90-92, 96-98, 12 Doos.
(1969-70); Eur. Consult. Ass., 22d Sess., Doc. No. 2795 at 15, 4 Doos. (1970-71);
Eur. Consult. Ass., 21st Sess. (3d Part), TaxTs ADOPTED, Recommendation 583, para. 8
(1970).
94. See Council of Europe Doc. H (65) 16, paras. 36-37 (1965); Eur. Consult.
Ass., 21st Sess., Doc. No. 2703 at 26-28, paras. 81-87, 12 Docs. (1969-70); Eur. Consult.
Ass., 22d Sess., Doc. No. 2795 at 15, 4 Docs. (1970-71); Eur. Consult. Ass., 21st Sess.
(3d Part), TEXTS ADOPTED, Recommendation 583, para. 8 (1970).
95. See Eur. Consult. Ass., 11th Sess., Doc. No. 1057 at 8, § 6, 6 Docs. (1959);
Eur. Consult. Ass., 21st Sess., Doc. No. 2596, 4 Doos. (1969-70); Eur. Consult. Ass.,
13th Sess., TEXT ADOPTED, Recommendation 285 (1961). See also item 2211/3 of the
1971-72 intergovernmental work program of the Council of Europe.
96. But see International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 21
GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, arts. 13, 14, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
97. But compare Covenant, art. 12, para. 2 with Protocol No. 4 to the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, para. 2 (1963).
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consequence, 98 others seem rather significant. In many fields, the Covenant will impose heavier obligations than the European instruments,
regarding:
(1) the conditions for imposing and executing the death penalty
(article 6, paragraphs 2, 4 and 5, of the Covenant; article 2, paragraph 1, of the Convention) ;
(2) medical or scientific experimentation on the human person (second sentence of article 7 of the Covenant; article 3 of the Convention) ;
(3) work required of detainees (article 8, paragraph 3 (c) (i), of the
Covenant; article 4, paragraph 3 (a), of the Convention);
(4) expulsion of aliens (article 13 of the Covenant; article 4 of Protocol Number 4) ; 99
(5) the right to a good administration of justice, particularly in criminal matters (right of appeal, indemnification of victims of judicial errors, ne bis in idem, etc.: paragraphs 3, subparagraphs (b)
and (g), 4, 5, 6 and 7 of article 14 of the Covenant; article 6,
paragraph 3, of the Convention) ;100
(6) the right to the benefit under new criminal law of a lighter penalty
(article 15, paragraph 1, of the Covenant; article 7, paragraph 1,
of the Convention) ;01
98. See Covenant, art. 2, paras. 1, 3 and Convention, arts. 13-14; Covenant, art.
5, para. 1 and Convention, art. 17; Covenant, art. 7 (first sentence) and Convention,
art. 3; Covenant, art. 8, para. 1 and Convention, art. 4, para. 1 (slave trade); Covenant,
art. 9, para. 1 (first sentence) and Convention, art. 5, para. 1 (first sentence) (French

text: sicuriti and suret9); Covenant, art. 9, para. 2 and Convention, art. 5, para. 2;
Covenant, art. 14, para. 1 (first and second sentences) and Convention, art. 6, para. 1
(first sentence); Covenant, art. 14, para. 2 and Convention, art. 6, para. 2; Covenant,
art. 14, para. 3(a), (e), (f) and Convention, art. 6, para. 3a, d, e; Covenant, art. 15
(excluding last sentence of paragraph 1) and Convention, art. 7.
99. But see European Convention on Establishment, art. 3, E.T.S. No. 19 (1955).
See also Eur. Consult. Ass., 11th Sess. (Part 3), Doe. No. 1057 at 11, para. 12, 6 Doas.
(1959); Council of Europe Doe. H (65) 16, paras. 31-34 (1965).
100. As regards: (1) the right of appeal, see the Strasbourg Commission's decision
on the admissibility of Application No. 2366/64, 10 Y.B. 216 (1967); (2) reparation
for damage caused by judicial error, see the decision on the admissibility of Application
No. 1473/62 (unpublished) (1963) and Council of Europe Doc. CDII (68) 3 at 16, 17,
19 (confidential) (1968); (3) the ne bis in idem principle, see decisions on the admissibility of Application No. 1519/62, 6 Y.B. 348 (1963), and Application 4212/69, 35 COLL.
OF DECISIONS OF THE EUR. COMM'N. OF HUMAN RIGHTS 153-54 (1969); Council of
Europe Docs. DH (63) 8 at 6-7 (1963) and DH (67) 2 at 5 (1967); European Convention on Extradition, art. 9, E.T.S. No. 24 (1957); European Convention on the
International Validity of Criminal Judgments, arts. 53-55, E.T.S. No. 70 (1970).
101. See the decisions on the admissibility of Application No. 192/56 (unpublished)
(1956) and Application No. 327/57 (unpublished) (1958): question left unanswered.
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(7) the right to respect for private and family life (attacks on one's
honor and reputation: article 17, paragraph 1, of the Covenant;
article 8, paragraph 1, of the Convention) ;102
(8) freedoms of expression, assembly and association (articles 19, 21
and 22 of the Covenant; articles 10, 11 and 16 of the Convention) ;103
(9) freedom of consent of intending spouses and equality of husband
and wife as to marriage (article 23, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the
Covenant; article 12 of the Convention);
(10) political rights (article 25, paragraph (b), of the Covenant; article 3 of Protocol Number 1) ;
(11) derogations authorized in the event of public emergency threatening the life of the nation (article 4 of the Covenant, especially
paragraph 2; article 15 of the Convention), etc.
On the other hand, the Covenant proves less generous than the
Convention and Protocols on the following subjects: 04
(1) on the right to life, subject to what has been said above (article
6 of the Covenant; article 2 of the Convention) ;
(2) on the right to liberty (articles 9 and 11 of the Covenant; article
5 of the Convention and article 1 of Protocol Number 4) ;
(3) on the right to enter the territory of one's own State (article 12,
paragraph 4, of the Covenant; article 3, paragraph 2, of Protocol
Number 4);
(4) on the admissible limitations on everyone's right to respect for
his private and family life and on freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs (articles 17 and 18, paragraph 3, of the Covenant;
paragraph 2 of articles 8 and 9 of the Convention), etc. 0 5
Whatever their exact extent, do these discrepancies between the
texts create a risk of conflicting international rules? Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Covenant and article 60 of the Convention seem to avert
any such danger.
102. But see Velu, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Right
to Respect for Private Life, Home and Communications, Report to the Brussels Colloquy
of October 1970, Doe. H/Coil. (70) 1 at 28-30 (provisional ed. 1970).
103. Zanghi, La liberti d'expression dans la Convention europ~enne des Droits
de 1/Homme et dans le Pacte des Nations Unies relatif aux droits civils et politiques,
1970 REvuF. GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 573-89.
104. Without prejudice to note 109 infra.
"105. See also the general standard of article 18 of the Convention (abuse of
power) which has no equivalent in the Covenant.
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Article 5, paragraph2, of the Covenant
There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of
the fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any State
Party to the . .. Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, regulations
or custom on the pretext that the . . . Covenant does not recognize

such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent.
Article 60 of the Convention
Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting
or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High Contracting
Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party.
While the Convention of November 4, 1950 certainly figures
among the "conventions" mentioned in article 5, paragraph 2, of the
Covenant, it is not clear that the Convention treats the Covenant similarly. One might contend that article 60 refers solely to laws and agreements existing at the time of its signature, ratification or entry into
force. In support of this view, it could be pointed out that article 60
uses the present tense ("is a Party") and not the future (for example,
"is or will become a Party"). Such an argument would not be convincing. Highly disputable in itself, 106 it would also lead to consequences so
absurd that it would prove untenable: it would result in removing from
the ambit of article 60 not only the two Covenants of December 16,
1966, but also quite a few European conventions like the Social Charter
of October 18, 1961. Since the Council of Europe aims at the "further
07
realization" of human rights in addition to their "maintenance,"' it
would be hard to understand why a convention drawn up under its
auspices should claim to prevent Member States from going ahead in
this field.
It would seem to follow that the Convention will not restrict the
scope of the Covenant, and vice versa.' 08 The more favorable provisions
of the Covenant, however, will not be incorporated in the European
106. A vast majority of the articles of the Convention are in the present tense in their
French text. There are, however, a few exceptions, one being the opening phrases of
article 60 (ne sera interpritde). Compare with section I (A) (2) (a) supra (art. 62).
107. The Statute of the Council of Europe, art. 1; Convention, Preamble,
108. This opinion is shared by the Committee of Experts on Human Rights.
Council of Europe Doc. H (70) 7 at 23, para. 84 (1970).
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system of protection. 109 Article 60 confines itself to prohibiting that the
Convention be "construed" as relieving Contracting States from
heavier obligations undertaken or to be undertaken by them under
domestic law or international agreements; it would be wrong to conclude that a breach of these obligations would of itself infringe
the Convention.11 0
Yet, what about article 15, paragraph 1, of the Convention, according to which measures of derogation must not be "inconsistent
with . . . other obligations under international law"?" 1 If by any
chance a State derogated from the Convention but not from the Covenant, it might be necessary to scrutinize the meaning of the term "international law": in the present context, does this term refer exclusively to general international law, or does it embrace all international commitments of each of the Contracting States, including possibly the Covenant? Without expressing an opinion on the point, we
should note that the latter view is more in keeping with the wording
of article 15,112 although its adoption would entail inequality of treatment between those States." 3
One could even conceive of asserting that it would be paradoxical
if the Convention were less stringent in normal times than in those
109. Id. at 23, para. 85. Incidentally, article 5, paragraph 2, of the Covenant is
perhaps less clear than article 60 of the Convention in this respect: "There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from ......
110. The Strasbourg Commission considers that it is not for it "to check on the
proper administration of municipal law" save "in matters where the Convention refers"
to that law. See, e.g., App. No. 1169/61, 6 Y.B. 588 (1963). On the other hand, the
draft prepared by the European Movement in July, 1949, contained (together with an
article 4 comparable to article 60 of the Convention) an article 6, paragraph (b),
which read as follows:
Any additions to the above-mentioned rights which may be effected after the
signing of [the] Convention as a result of changes in law or administrative
practice shall, as from the date of such changes, be guaranteed in the same
manner as the rights existing at the date of the signing of [the] Convention
by the State concerned.

Doe. INF/5/E/R at 8 (1949).
111. Compare with Covenant, art. 4, para. 1.
112. Cf. the maxim: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus (Where
the law does not distinguish, neither ought we to distinguish). Compare Convention, art.
15 ("international law") with Convention, arts. 26 and 7, para. 2 ("generally recognised
rules of international law" and "general principles of law recognised by civilised nations")
and Protocol No. 1 ("general principles of international law"). The European Court has
not yet had occasion to decide the issue. See "Lawless" Case, 4 Y.B. 480-82, paras. 39-41

(1961).
113. The Convention creates or tolerates many such inequalities by its numerous
references to the national legislations, its optional clauses and the reservations it authorizes. Article 15 would therefore have nothing unusual in this respect.
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circumstances of extreme gravity-war or public emergency threatening
the life of the nation-when article 15 requires compliance with "other
obligations under international law." Notwithstanding its appealing
logic, this reasoning would strain the letter and spirit of the Convention. 114 If one were to approve of it, the Commission, Court and Committee of Ministers would face a considerable increase in work: it would
be their permanent function to supervise the observance of innumerable international rules; the Strasbourg Commission has found itself
incompetent to do this."15
III. Tit

LINKS BETWEEN THE PROCEDURAL AND NORMATIVE ASPECTS

Having thus seen that the normative aspect of the matter of "coexistence" proves less delicate than the procedural one, we shall now
examine the close connection between the two elements and the arbitrariness of attempting to disassociate them. There is a risk that questions relating to the merits may make problems of implementation
more acute, notwithstanding the relative simplicity of the former and
the precautionary measures suggested to solve the latter. The Convention and its Protocols do not guarantee some of the rights which the
Covenant seeks to protect; where the two catalogs coincide, the "universal" definition is sometimes more liberal than the "European." One
might contend that this is a factor likely to encourage States-and to
an even greater extent individuals-to turn to the New York Committee rather than to the Strasbourg Commission.
On another line of thinking, it will be recalled that several States
consider the Convention an integral part of their internal law and at'tribute to it a self-executing character."16 Assuming that in their view the
same is true of the Covenant,"17 their courts would have to apply this in114. The said reasoning was developed at least once before the Strasbourg Commission. Unfortunately, the relevant documents have not been made public.

115. Decisions on the admissibility of Applications Nos. 1821/63 and 1822/63, 9
Y.B. 230 (1968) and of Application No. 5459/72 (to be published shortly in volume
'40 of Collection of Decisions of the European Commission of Human Rights). See also
Sorensen, La recevabilitj de l'instance devant la Cour europienne des Droits de l'Homme,
in 1 RE i CASSIN AMIcoRuas DiSCIPULORUmQUE LIBER 338 (1969).
116. See, e.g., Buergenthal, The Domestic Status of the European Convention of
Human Rights, 13 'BuFFALO L. REv. 354 (1964); Buergenthal, The Effect of the
European Convention on Human Rights on the Internal Law of Member States, Supp.
No. 11 INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 79 (1965); Buergenthal, The Domestic Status of the
European Convention of Human Rights: A Second Look, 1966 J. INT'L COamb. JUR. 55.
117. See J.Da.MEYER, supra note 29, at 7-12; Covenant, arts. 2, paras. 1 & 2, 40,

paras. 1 & 2.

PROBLEMS OF COEXISTENCE

strument concurrently with the Convention and with ordinary domestic
legislation. They would presumably give preference to those clauses
which are most favorable to the individual, but they would first have
to identify these clauses. We believe that such a task would present
them with a very thorny problem.11 s
The European States would eliminate this double difficulty if
they were to fill in the "normative gap" which remains between the
Convention and Covenant. By means of Protocol Number 4 of September 16, 1963, they dosed the initial margin to a considerable extent,
and they did so intentionally without awaiting the actual adoption of
the Covenant; 119 yet they have not eliminated it altogether. It would
therefore be desirable that they study the possibility of a new Protocol
designed to:
(1) include in the European system those individual rights which are
not presently covered there and protection of which is provided
for in the Covenant; and
(2) harmonize the "European" definition of the rights already written into the Convention and Protocols with their "universal"
definition, insofar as the latter tends to secure a better safeguard
for human beings.
We should not, however, delude ourselves with vain hopes. The
governments have declined to insert in Protocol Number 4 texts concerning equality before the law and everyone's right to the recognition
of his legal personality; 20 and enlightened jurists have been conscious
for a long time of the need to bring the "European" definitions into
line with the "universal" wherever that would mean progress. Thus
the Chairman of the Consultative Assembly's Legal Committee, Mr.
Hermod Lannung, observed in 1958:
The "universal" definition... seems, in certain cases, to go further
than the "European." Probably the Council of Europe will sooner or
later have to adapt the second to the first insofar as the latter is more
liberal. It would perhaps be premature to go into this problem at
present, but it would be fitting to bear it in mind and consider means
of solving it when the time comes. 12 '
118. See J. DE MEYER, supra note 29, at 22-23; Modinos, supra note 6, at 66.
119. See Eur. Consult. Ass., 11th Sess. (3d Part), Doc. No. 1057 at 7, para. 5, 6
Docs. (1959); Council of Europe Doc. H (65) 16 passim (1965).
120. See Council of Europe Doc. H. (65) 16, paras. 35-37 (1965).
121. Council of Europe Doc. AS/Jur XII(10)1 (extract produced by Modinos,
supra note 6, at 57 n.32. See alsa 2 TRAVAux PR kPARATOIRES 476-77 (1950); 4 TRAvAux
PRAPARATOmxs 1017 (1950) ; Khol, supra note 39, at 191.
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What was then deemed to be premature has clearly ceased to be
so now. If the governments were prepared to confront the consequences,
if they did not hesitate to elaborate a sixth Protocol of which the drafting and entry into force would require years and which would impose
upon them additional obligations accompanied by a system of supervision stricter than its universal counterpart, they could be more certain of avoiding the "short-circuiting" of the Strasbourg organs and of
helping the indisputable institutional superiority of the Convention
to come to full fruition. 122 Without in any way neglecting their duties
towards the United Nations, they would consolidate and complete the
edifice they built in Rome on November 4, 1950. They would demonstrate once more that the Convention is of a "forward-looking nature"
and that not content to leave "room for bolder or more generous conceptions,"' 23 it is continuously regenerating itself. It is to be hoped that
they will not surrender to the temptation of doing what demands the
least effort.
On July 8, 1971, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of
Europe-or more precisely, the Standing Committee acting on its
behalf 12 4 -adopted Recommendation 642 "on the ratification of the
United Nations Covenants on Human Rights.' 12 , "Aware" of the "important questions" raised by "the co-existence of the U.N. Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocol and the European Convention on Human Rights," it welcomed both "the study
made of these questions by the Committee of Experts on Human
Rights" and Resolution (70) 17 of the Committee of Ministers. It
went on to express its belief "that the completion of this study [had]
indicated the measures necessary to remove the difficulties which
might arise, and thus [made] it possible for member States to ratify
the United Nations texts." It also declared itself "convinced that the
two systems of protection of Human Rights, regional and universal,
are not conflicting but complementary."
After noting that only one member State of the Council of Europe,
122. Whether or not they intend to do so does not emerge from the Committee
of Ministers' decisions of May and June, 1970, insofar as they have been made public.
Eur. Consult. Ass., 22d Sess., Doc. No. 2795 at 22-23, 53-54, 4 Docs. (1970-71).
123. Eur. Consult. Ass., l1th Sess. (3d Part), Doe. No. 1057 at 6-7, para. 2, 6
Does. (1959).
124. Eur. Consult. Ass., Rules of Procedure, 32, para. 4 and 46, paras. 4, 6, 7.
125. See also the corresponding report of the Legal Affairs Committee, Eur.
Consult. Ass., 23d Sess., Doe. No. 2962, 3 Docs. (1971-72).
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Cyprus, had ratified the Covenant, and that none had ratified the Optional Protocol, 2 6 the Assembly recommended
that the Committee of Ministers invite member States (other than
Cyprus) to ratify as soon as possible the U.N. Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 27 the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Optional Protocol thereto, 28 taking account of
the recommendations made by the Committee of Ministers concerning
the problems that might arise owing to the coexistence of the U.N.
Covenant29 and the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Consultative Assembly-with whom the Committee of Ministers generally expressed agreement in January, 1972 130-thus marked
its high appreciation of the United Nations Covenants. Its very positive attitude seems the more striking and significant as Recommendation
642, of July 8, 1971, originated in a motion tabled on December 7,
1970,131 i.e., later than a motion of September 24, 1970, "on the ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights by all member
States," about which the Legal Affairs Committee has so far submitted
no report. 13 2 That the Assembly thereby granted priority, in a way, to
another organization's offspring over its own child may be considered
somewhat paradoxical and surprising, but it certainly constitutes a
126. See note 10 supra.

127. Without awaiting the outcome of the study noted in note 15, supra. See
Eur. Consult. Ass., 23d Sess., Doe. No. 2962 at 16-71, paras. 27-29, 3 Docs. (1971-72);
see also note 129 infra.

128. Taken literally, Recommendation 642 could give the impression that the
Assembly does not want member States to issue the declaration provided for in article
41 of the Covenant, nor Cyprus to ratify the Optional Protocol. Of course, this is not
the case and the absence of express indications on these items is to be ascribed solely
to an oversight on the part of the drafters.
129. French text: "des Pactes." Since the draft recommendation appearing in the
report of the Legal Affairs Committee used the plural in both official versions (document 2962, supra at note 125) it may be assumed that a misprint occurred subsequently
in the English version. It should be noted, however, that there were as of July 8, 1971,
are at present (September 1972), and probably will be no recommendations of the
Committee of Ministers about the coexistence of the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights with the Convention. The same does not apply to the coexistence of the
said covenant with the European Social Charter (see note 15 supra), but no mention
of this subject is to be found in Recommendation 642 which, here again, seems a bit
imprecise.
130. Eur. Consult. Ass., 23d Sess., Doe. No. 3067 at 1-3, 13 Does. (1971-72).
131. Eur. Consult. Ass., 22d Sess., Doe. No. 2862, 8 Does. (1970-71).
132. Eur. Consult. Ass., 22d Sess., Doe. No. 2841, 7 Does. (1970-71). The last
recommendation aimed at inter alia the ratification of the Convention by France and
Switzerland dates back to January 30, 1969. Eur. Consult. Ass., 20th Sess. (3d Part).
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gesture of genuine good will which must be applauded if it meets with
reciprocity.
Was the Assembly right in forming an optimistic opinion as to
the adequacy of the measures suggested to Member States by the Committee of Ministers? This is a slightly different matter. Only experience
will show whether the decision which has been adopted will prove
effective and sufficient, or whether further measures were, and if it is not
too late, still are required by the prevailing circumstances.
(September 1972)

